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ARTICLE
Expertise, Agreement, and the Nature of Social Scientiﬁc Facts
or: Against Epistocracy
Julian Reiss
Department of Philosophy, Durham University, Durham, UK
ABSTRACT
Taking some controversial claims philosopher Jason Brennan makes in his
book Against Democracy (Brennan 2016) as a starting point, this paper
argues in favour of two theses: (1) There is No Such Thing as Superior
Political Judgement; (2) There Is No Such Thing as Uncontroversial Social
Scientiﬁc Knowledge. I conclude that social science experts need to be kept
in check, not given more power.
KEYWORDS
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epistemic authority
Let me begin with a personal note. This paper was born out of exasperation. My exasperation is caused
by a relatively recent tendency among philosophers and other students of science to push to elevate
the role of science, in particular of social science, in society. I grew up, philosophically, in a climate that
was sceptical of those who aggrandise science, those who maintain that scientiﬁc knowledge claims
stand apart from all other claims to knowledge, and in particular those who think that scientiﬁc experts
should be given special powers in society. This kind of scepticism today seems like a thing of the distant
past. Instead we are told again to submit to the authority of science (including social science) and to
leave technical questions, including technical questions of great social relevance and potential impact,
to the scientiﬁc experts — because they know what they are talking about.
I think not, and the aim of this paper is to explain why. Though in principle many of arguments
apply elsewhere in science as well, I will focus on the social sciences here, of which I am more
familiar and which have dramatically increased in social signiﬁcance in recent times. For speciﬁcity
I will also focus on an important recent contribution to the debate. The issues discussed therein are
entirely general, however. I use it as a peg to hang on my own thoughts about the role of scientiﬁc
experts in society and that of consensus in science.
I. There is No Such Thing as Superior Political Judgement
My example of an aggrandizement of social science is Jason Brennan’s Against Democracy (Brennan
2016). Brennan is Robert J. and Elizabeth Flanagan Family Chair and Provost’s Distinguished
Professor of Strategy, Economics, Ethics, and Public Policy at the McDonough School of Business
at Georgetown University. He is also a libertarian (see for instance Brennan 2012; 2014). Now,
libertarians have a complicated relationship to democracy. Since the protection of freedoms is their
overriding goal, democracy can, at best, be instrumentally valuable. It is valuable (and legitimate)
only to the extent that it promotes freedoms and to be avoided (and illegitimate) to the extent that
freedoms are curbed. Whether democracy tends to enhance freedoms or curtail them depends on
what precisely is meant by the terms, but that democracy cannot be unlimited if freedoms are to
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be preserved is fairly obvious and has been discussed in modern political theory at least since
Tocqueville’s Democracy in America.
That democracy might jeopardise freedoms is, however, not Brennan’s stated reason to reject
democracy. Instead he makes a perfectionist case against democracy. He argues that democracies
tend to produce to poor outcomes because voters are, on average, incompetent. He also argues in
favour of an alternative system of government called ‘epistocracy’. While he does not advocate
a speciﬁc form of epistocracy, all forms have in common that voting power is roughly proportional
to the voter’s knowledge of social science facts and principles. An epistocracy suppresses the
voices of incompetent individuals by banning them from voting altogether, by giving fewer votes
to them than to more competent individuals, or by blocking incompetent decisions through
a body of experts with veto power. By attenuating the inﬂuence of incompetent individuals and
strengthening that of competent individuals, epistocracy is argued to lead to better outcomes.
Brennan’s arguments against democracy and in favour of epistocracy build on a number of
controversial premisses, only some of which are defended by him. He explicitly argues that voters
are ‘ignorant, irrational, misinformed nationalists’, and he provides a fair amount of evidence in
favour of this claim (Chapter 2). In fact, the case is much less clear-cut than Brennan makes it
appear. The evidence he cites is subject to signiﬁcant selection bias and many claims leave
a number of alternative interpretations open. Take, for instance, the following:
During the 2000 US presidential election, while slightly more than half of all Americans knew Al Gore was more
liberal than Bush, they did not seem to understand what the word liberal means. Fifty-seven percent of them
knew Gore favored a higher level of spending than Bush did, but signiﬁcantly less than half knew that Gore
was more supportive of abortion rights, more supportive of welfare state programs, favored a higher degree of
aid to blacks, or was more supportive of environmental regulation. (Brennan 2016, 62 [page numbers refer to
the iBook version]; data from; Somin 2013)
One might call this ignorance. Alternatively, one could postulate that voters are no diﬀerent from
other organisms that live in a complex environment and have to make do with limited cognitive
capacities and time to reach a decision. In situations like this, it is not at all rational to collect all
potentially relevant information before making a decision. Instead, the organism can use a heuristic
that enables it to make a decision that is good enough and requires no more information than the
organism can handle in the relevant timeframe. In the present case, the organism could use, for
instance, the take-the-best heuristic. That heuristic estimates which of two alternatives has a higher
value on a criterion by choosing the alternative based on the ﬁrst cue that discriminates between
the alternatives. To decide which of two politicians is preferable a smart voter thus might look at
a small number of issues (‘cues’) that are important to him or her and decide on the basis of the
ﬁrst issue that discriminates between the two. Since these issues may diﬀer from individual to
individual, the fact that on average voters don’t know where a candidate stands on any given issue
is not a sign of individual ignorance. The take-the-best heuristic does pretty well in forecasting
election outcomes from information about how voters expect the candidates to deal with the most
important issue facing the country (Graefe and Armstrong 2012). Another study found that about
75% of voters in the ﬁve U.S. Presidential Elections from 1972 to 1988 ‘voted correctly’ in the sense
that they voted for the candidate that they would have chosen anyway if they had possessed full
information (Rau and Redlawsk 1997).
Another premiss Brennan argues for explicitly is the existence of objective competence in
political matters. He often speaks of ‘superior political judgment’ (possessed by some individuals
but not others) and compares it to the superior judgement of pilots in matters of ﬂying planes,
plumbers in matters of plumbing, and surgeons in matters of surgery. This is similar to the
argument one often hears in the context of discussing the role of experts in society, one that
has been attacked up by Paul Feyerabend a long time ago:
Is it not safer in the case of serious illness to trust the judgement of a physician than the judgement of a witch,
and should physicians not therefore receive a special position in our society? (Feyerabend [1976] 1999, 125)
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I want to challenge the analogy Brennan makes between political judgement and other types of
judgement, which I’ll subsume under the term ‘technical judgement’. Let us suppose that there is
such a thing as superior technical judgement. Would that present a good reason to believe that
there is also superior political judgement? Political and technical judgement are disanalogous in
important ways. In technical judgements, there is a unique or overriding clear-cut goal the expert
and his or her client agree on. In Brennan’s examples, the respective goals are: arriving at the
destination safely and on time, having ﬂowing warm and cold water without leakage, and
performing an agreed-upon surgery with the least amount of collateral damage. Even if in some
cases trade-oﬀs between subgoals could be construed (say, between ‘arriving safely’ and ‘arriving
on time’), one of the subgoals is clearly overriding and stands in a lexical relationship with the
other. The opposite is the case in political matters. Here the existence of a multitude of goals is the
norm, and there are always conﬂicts and trade-oﬀs between diﬀerent goals. It is therefore that the
judgement cannot be left to a technical expert.
Moreover, in technical decision problemsmeans-ends relationships are very well understood. This is
what makes the problems technical problems. One can learn how to ﬂy a plane safely, how to plumb
eﬀectively, how to perform surgeries. Means-ends relationships in political matters are far less well
understood. This is in part because the goals themselves are often vague and under-speciﬁed. And it is
in part because we simply lack the technical knowledge of what measures to implement in order to
realise a goal, even in cases this goal is agreed upon and speciﬁc. I will come back to this point below.
There are thus three reasons to reject the idea that there is such a thing as ‘superior political
judgement’. First, an important part of making a political judgment involves trade-oﬀs between
diﬀerent social goals such as freedom vs. equality or wealth vs. security. While an expert might
have a better understanding of the nature of these trade-oﬀs, coming down on one side or the
other can only be based on values that are in no way more accessible to the expert than the
layperson. Second, there is considerable uncertainty in the the application of a value or goal in
a concrete context. Is a society in which everyone is poor except for elite party members more
equal than one in which the average member is more wealthy but the distribution follows a power
law? According to which index? Who determines that that index is the appropriate one to use?
Third, there is considerable uncertainty in the means-ends relationships, even when there is
agreement on which goals to pursue and what that means in a given context.
A premiss Brennan leaves implicit and undefended is that there is a correlation between
‘knowledge of social science’ and ‘superior political judgement’. (If he didn’t presume that there
is such a correlation, it would hardly make sense to demand that voters be better educated in
social science.) Suppose then, for the sake of the argument, that there is such a thing as superior
political judgement. Do we ﬁnd it among people with high levels of social science knowledge?
Brennan surely thinks so:
[. . .] I justiﬁably believe that I – a named professor of strategy, economics, ethics, and public policy at an elite
research university, with a PhD from the top-ranked political philosophy program in the English-speaking
world, and a strong record of peer-reviewed publications in top journals and academic presses – have superior
political judgment on a great many political matters compared to many of my fellow citizens, including to
many large groups of them. If I didn’t believe that about myself, I’d feel like a fraud every time I teach a political
economy course. (240; emphasis original)
One couldn’t make this stuﬀ up if one tried, could one?
Given there is no such thing as superior political judgement, it is hard to show empirically that it
does or doesn’t correlate with social science knowledge. Now, postulating that there is such a thing
for the time being, as I have done, we can also postulate that superior political judgement
correlates with success at predicting political events, and we can study whether that correlates
with social science knowledge in turn.
This is just what Philip Tetlock has done in a 20-year study of expert political judgement (Tetlock
2006). Alas, the results are sobering. The forecasters were 284 experts from a variety of ﬁelds,
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including government oﬃcials, professors, journalists, and others, with many political views, from
Marxists to free-marketeers. The tournaments solicited roughly 28,000 predictions about the future
and found the forecasters were often only slightly more accurate than chance, and usually worse
than basic extrapolation algorithms, especially on longer–range forecasts three to ﬁve years out.
Forecasters with the biggest news media proﬁles were especially bad. The research shows that ‘The
attentive reader of the New York Times is likely to be as adept at picking up predictive cues as
renowned area study specialists’ (87).
Nor is Tetlock’s study alone in ﬁnding this result. A paper on forecasting the decisions made in
conﬂicts by Keston Green and J. Scott Armstrong concludes:
The people we surveyed expected that forecasting decisions in conﬂicts would be diﬃcult. Our ﬁndings
conﬁrmed this. Most respondents nonetheless expected experts to be better forecasters than novices. They
were wrong. Expertise did not improve accuracy. Neither experts nor novices did substantially better than
guessing. (Green and Armstrong 2007, 293)
This, in turn, is consistent with much older research by one of the two authors that surveyed
existing literature on expert forecasting (Armstrong 1980). Many more studies come to similar
conclusions.
To be fair to Brennan, he does cite Tetlock (2006), albeit in a diﬀerent context, and criticises the
work on two counts (375–7). He argues that Tetlock never tests experts against laypersons proper
because the ‘laypersons’ in Tetlock’s sample were Berkeley undergraduate students. Thus: ‘Tetlock
was testing the cognitive hyperelites against the cognitive superelites’ (376). According to Brennan,
Tetlock also biased the study by focusing on questions the experts themselves regard as the ‘hard’
questions. By contrast, Brennan wants to focus on views experts can all agree on (377).
Other research replicates Tetlock’s major results, however, and ‘random guessing’ is often
among the alternatives. The problem is that expert forecasts are hardly more accurate than
guesswork. Moreover, Brennan ostensibly argues in favour of epistocracy (government of those
with a certain kind of knowledge) rather than aristocracy (government of the best). By comparing
experts with Berkeley students, Tetlock controls for factors such as general education and intelli-
gence and is able to address the question whether more subject-speciﬁc knowledge improves
forecast accuracy. It doesn’t. And that is a problem for Brennan’s account.
Brennan’s second point was that Tetlock’s study is biased because it only looks at ‘hard
questions’. I will argue below that most social science questions are of this kind and that there is
very little, if anything, we can all agree on.
II. There Is No Such Thing as Uncontroversial Social Scientiﬁc Knowledge
This leads straight to the next premiss Brennan leaves implicit and undefended: that there is such
a thing as uncontroversial social scientiﬁc knowledge. Let us grant Brennan that ‘there is. . . a wide
range of agreed-on views, such as that we should have free trade and avoid price controls’ (377).
The problem is that such agreement exists, if at all, at best among mainstream economists. When
we look a little farther aﬁeld, for instance to heterodox economists, historians of economics, socio-
economists and the like we are very unlikely to encounter agreement. For instance, Ha-Joon Chang
writes about the historical track record of free trade policies:
With only a few exceptions, all of today’s rich countries, including Britain and the US – the supposed homes of
free trade and free market – have become rich through the combinations of protectionism, subsidies and other
policies that today they advise the developing countries not to adopt. Free-market policies have made few
countries rich so far and will make few rich in the future. (Chang 2010, 101)
According to Chang, a combination of anti-free market policies made rich countries rich. And
countries that adopted free-market policies in early stages of development? As Joan Robinson
comments on the fate of Portugal vs England:
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The imposition of free trade on Portugal killed oﬀ a promising textile industry and left her with a slow-growing
export market for wine, while for England, exports of cotton cloth led to accumulation, mechanisation and the
whole spiralling growth of the industrial revolution. (Robinson 1978, 103)
Neither Chang nor Robinson are mainstream, let alone neoclassical economists. Chang, because he
revived the so-called ‘infant industry argument’ is sometimes associated with the German Historical
School (one of the members of which, Friedrich List, was the ﬁrst systematic developer of this
argument: List 1841), Robinson with the Post-Keynesian school (though both are a lot more original
than these labels suggest). But the point is: whether there is agreement on an economic or social
issue or not depends on where we look, and there are no standards according to which we can
judge an individual economist’s type and level of expertise that are independent of theoretical and
political convictions.
In the social sciences, judgements about legitimate expertise are inextricably bound up with
membership in schools of thought, which in turn are often strongly associated with politics. This is
certainly true in the ﬁeld from which Brennan draws most of his examples, economics. It is dubious
whether a contemporary Austrian School or Post-Keynesian economist has even interactional
expertise in neoclassical economics, let alone contributory expertise (and vice versa). Austrians,
Post-Keynesians and neoclassical economists publish in their own respective journals, organise
their own conferences and make radically diﬀerent assumptions about ontology, epistemology,
and causality. They will be able to follow the broad strokes of each other’s work but do not
normally regard members of other schools of thought as being part of the same discourse and
therefore able to contribute expertise.
What makes matters worse is that school membership tends to go along with politics. I have
never met a left-leaning Austrian but would be very surprised to meet a Post-Keynesian who is not
left leaning. Neoclassical economics, due to its theoretical dearth, includes a broad spectrum of
political views, but this does not mean that it is free of politics, or freer than other schools.
More generally, value judgements are never far from the surface of a social scientiﬁc investiga-
tion (Dupré 2007; Reiss 2008, 2013, 2017). Take Brennan’s free trade example. As we have seen, he
argues that there is agreement among (mainstream) economists that free trade is a good thing.
Many value judgements need to be made to reach this verdict. Even in a highly simpliﬁed two-by-
two toy model, within which we can show that free trade leads to an increase in economic product,
there are winners and losers. If, to use Ricardo’s original example of the two countries England and
Portugal and two goods ‘cloth’ and ‘wine’, the two countries start trading with each other, each will
specialise in the production of the good for which it has a comparative advantage (Ricardo 1817,
Ch. 7). Thus, England will specialise in the production of cloth and Portugal in the production of
wine. This, however, means that there are wine producers in England and sheep farmers in
Portugal who are harmed by the arrangement. To claim that free trade is a good thing for
England and Portugal means to assume (a) that an increase in economic product is a good
thing; (b) that the harms English wine producers and Portuguese sheep farmers experience are
morally outweighed by the increase in economic product. Neither assumption can be justiﬁed
without making value judgements.
Some economists go on to argue that potential losers of free-trade arrangements can be
compensated. But the ‘can’ is really important here. It is true, within the model, that the
economic product increases, and so money is available for the compensation of losers.
However, in practice this rarely happens. Losers are seldom fully (ﬁnancially) compensated for
the loss of their income when new trade arrangements are entered. Moreover, even if they
were, ﬁnancial transfers can hardly compensate for the loss of an occupation in a speciﬁc
industry. Being a wine maker is something quite diﬀerent from working in a cloth factory or
receiving state beneﬁts.
So a society has to make a choice whether it values the increase in average wealth over the
working lives of individuals in industries that are likely to be negatively aﬀected from a trade deal.
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No amount of subject expertise will help to address this question. Because interests are involved,
we can try to answer it on the basis of how it aﬀects us, or we can try to use Adam Smith’s tool of
an ‘impartial spectator’ and answer the question on the basis of moral reﬂection (Smith 1759/2002).
Either way, knowledge of economics won’t help, only value judgements will.
The astute reader will long have noticed that Brennan’s example is question begging with
respect to value judgements because the question whether free trade is good for a nation is value
laden right from the start. A statement drawn from the heart of positive economics such as ‘Free
trade raises GDP’ won’t do any better, however. Values are involved in measuring GDP (e.g. Stiglitz,
Sen, and Fitoussi 2010), the theories of rational choice that are often employed in modelling
economic relationships (Sen 1993), the testing and acceptance of scientiﬁc hypotheses (Rudner
1953), among other things. Though an exhaustive treatment of these arguments concerning fact/
value entanglement in positive or predictive social science will have to wait for another day, I do
think that they are sound for the most part. ‘Free trade raises GDP’ is similarly value laden as ‘Free
trade is good for a nation’.
I should point out that it is in many cases possible to agree on an aspect of a research procedure
without explicit agreement on a set of value judgements. Economists might, for example, agree
that GDP is the correct measure of economic product without explicitly discussing all the evalua-
tive concerns that are involved in constructing and implementing the indicator. Similarly, they
could agree that setting the statistical signiﬁcance level to 5% is the appropriate choice without
explicitly trading oﬀ the consequences of false positives and false negatives. So it is not the case
that every individual scientist faces the problem of making value judgements all the time. However,
there is no way to defend the appropriateness of this or that measure or of this or that signiﬁcance
level or of this or that conception of rationality without making value judgements. Thus, when
challenged, individual scientists or groups of scientists have no choice but to defend their
standards by invoking value judgements. And since responding to criticism is essential to science,
the making of value judgements is (even if not for each scientist on a daily basis).
Deep fact/value entanglement is but one reason why we should expect economists and other
social scientists to disagree about matters of fact. Individuals in any sizeable group will disagree
about values, in part for reasons discussed above (see also Haidt 2013). But then if value judge-
ments aﬀect factual beliefs they should disagree about facts as well.
There are further sources of disagreement. Empirical generalisations in the social sciences hold
rarely, if ever, universally but are instead highly context-dependent. While it may well be true that
free trade does (tend to) spur economic growth for countries at a certain, relatively high level of
development, this truth is not incompatible with the existence of another truth, viz., that free trade
(tends to) decrease the economic potential for developing countries. More generally, social science
generalisations depend on (at least):
● time and place of application (Geoﬀrey Hodgson calls this the ‘problem of historical speciﬁ-
city’, see Hodgson 2001);
● whether the focus is on the short-run or on the long-run;
● the choice of contrast;
● the choice of measure or indicator.
Thus, in addition to the issue of applying the generalisation to nations at diﬀerent levels of
development, diﬀerent historical settings and diﬀerent cultural contexts, we have to distinguish
between short- and long-run eﬀects, might come to diﬀerent answers depending on whether we
contrast free trade with thorough protectionism or with an intelligent mix of free-market and
interventionist policies, and depending on what precisely we mean by free trade and whether we
examine the eﬀects on GDP or on an indicator that measures a wider concept of social welfare. The
problem is that diﬀerent speciﬁcations rarely yield similar results (so what’s true of one country or
period or cultural context might be false of another, the short-run eﬀect might diﬀer from the long-
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run eﬀect etc.), and it’s often not clear what the ‘right’ speciﬁcation is. Most economists agree that
Keynesian ﬁscal stimuli have a short-run expansionary eﬀect on GDP. But the long-run eﬀects are
disputed between Keynesians and conservatives, and Keynes’ dictum ‘in the long run we are all
dead’ does not cut much ice for the latter.
I want to emphasise that I do not seek to argue here that there are no facts in the social
sciences. Relative to a set of value judgements and a full speciﬁcation of the question at hand (with
respect at least to the four dimensions mentioned above), there may well be a fact of the matter.
However, in many contexts social scientists of diﬀerent convictions will disagree not only about
value judgments but also about which of a large number of possible speciﬁcation is the correct or
most relevant speciﬁcation.
It will be useful at this point to introduce a distinction between two kinds of social science facts.
‘Feeble facts’ correspond to true answers to fully speciﬁed research questions under an agreed-
upon set of value judgements. I call them feeble because there is no guarantee that they will
continue to hold under a variation of any aspect of the research question or value judgement.
‘Robust facts’ are those facts that do continue to hold under some variation of aspects of the
research question or value judgement. Because it is always possible that a fact is not robust under
a variation in value judgements or research question, when a feeble fact has been established,
additional evidence needs to be provided to establish the robustness of that fact.
We rarely talk in terms of feeble facts, however. Statements such as ‘Free trade is good for
a nation’ or even ‘Free trade boosts GDP’ would, if true, correspond to highly robust facts. Two
economists can disagree over the existence of a robust fact because one infers its existence from
one set of feeble facts, and the other, from another set. Of course, robust facts are more relevant to
policy concerns. If a general statement such as ‘Free trade boosts GDP’ were true, a policy
recommendation would follow almost immediately. The relevance of a more speciﬁc statement
such as ‘Free trade policies have helped to boost Victorian England’s GDP (as measured by
indicator i) over the short term, relative to set of alternative policies p and assuming the constella-
tion of value judgements v’ for a policy question is much less clear.
A ﬁnal source of disagreement is that testing is extraordinarily hard in these ﬁelds, in part
because there are no agreed-upon evidential standards. Two of the other examples Brennan
discusses illustrate this point. Take immigration ﬁrst. Brennan argues that most Americans are anti-
immigration, and that this is due to lack of knowledge of the matter (373; see also Caplan 2007;
Somin 2013). If they only knew economics, they’d realise that open borders would be a boon to the
American economy:
[T]he consensus among published economic work on immigration seems to be that the restriction introduced
by mostly closed borders on labor mobility is the single most ineﬃcient thing governments do. Scholarly
articles in economics estimate, on average, that the deadweight loss of immigration restrictions is around
100 percent of world product. (374)
The estimated ﬁgure of ‘around 100 percent of world product’ is indeed supported by evidence,
even though the survey Brennan cites actually reports a range of 50–150 percent of world GDP
(Clemens 2011, 84). But the estimates are all based on models (and there are only four!) that, much
like Ricardo’s two-by-two toy model of free trade, make heroic idealising assumptions. Two of the
models, for instance, ‘assume no diﬀerences in inherent productivity of migrants and nonmigrants’
(85), which is, well, let us say, optimistic.
Contrast this with left-leaning Oxford economist Paul Collier who presents a diﬀerent, more
nuanced and much broader reading of the evidence. Collier argues that there is an optimum level
of immigration in each country beyond which the (economic and social) costs outweigh the
beneﬁts (Collier 2013). Since current immigration levels in many Western nations are at or already
beyond the optimum, opening borders completely would not only not double their GDP but be
detrimental to Western societies, according to Collier.
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The point is not to argue that the heroic models are necessarily wrong and that Collier is right
or the other way around, but to illustrate that there are diﬀerent ways to assess the evidence. As
Joseph Schumpeter once said, ‘Economics is only an observational and interpretative science
which implies that in questions like ours the room for diﬀerence of opinion can be narrowed but
not reduced to zero’ (Schumpeter 1942/2003, 107). Brennan’s source takes a narrow view of
evidence with one target variable and a rigorous model to back up the empirical speciﬁcation.
Collier looks at a variety of economic, social and cultural eﬀects, distinguishes eﬀects on diﬀerent
groups (such as low-skilled vs. high skilled workers) and includes studies by economists, sociol-
ogists, historians, psychologists and others. There is no one way of collecting, weighing, inter-
preting and assessing evidence.
A third example Brennan mentions time and again is price theory and its (alleged) implication that
price controls are to be avoided: ‘no economically literate person now advocates price controls’ (332).
Well, minimum wages are of course a form of price controls, and there are armies of ‘economically
literate persons’ who advocate minimum wages. In this case too, it is the evidence that is read
diﬀerently by economists of diﬀerent convictions. As Nobel laureate Paul Krugman writes:
Until the Card-Krueger study, most economists, myself included, assumed that raising the minimum wage
would have a clear negative eﬀect on employment. But they found, if anything, a positive eﬀect. Their result
has since been conﬁrmed using data from many episodes. There’s just no evidence that raising the minimum
wage costs jobs, at least when the starting point is as low as it is in modern America. (Krugman 2015)
The ‘Card-Krueger study’ was a natural experiment in which one U.S. state (New Jersey) increased
the minimum wage while a neighbouring region with which it is highly economically integrated
(Western Pennsylvania) stayed put. David Neumark and William Wascher survey the literature using
a broader view of evidence and sum up their ﬁndings as follows:
Three conclusions, in particular, stand out. First, as indicated in chapter 3, the literature that has emerged since
the early 1990s on the employment eﬀects of minimum wages points quite clearly – despite a few prominent
outliers – to a reduction in employment opportunities for low-skilled and directly aﬀected workers. (Neumark
and Wascher 2008, 286)
Thus, even if there was agreement on values (a big if!) as well as on the speciﬁcation of the research
question (another big if), and there is a feeble fact corresponding to the true answer to our completely
speciﬁed research question, there is no guarantee that social scientists would come to an agreement
about the answer because they lack the means to ﬁnd the true answer in an uncontroversial fashion.
And even if they had found it, disagreement will remain about policy issues. Suppose, for instance, that
Chang and Robinson are right in their assessment that relatively large nations at a relatively low stage
of development are ill-advised to enter into free-trade agreements with more developed countries.
Suppose also that some nations have beneﬁtted from entering trade agreements. These facts hardly
determine what the answer is to the question whether contemporary Turkey should enter such an
agreement. Is contemporary Turkeymore like 19th century England ormore like 19th century Portugal?
If all of this is true, how can Brennan defend his view that ‘there is also a wide range of agreed-
upon views’? Citing libertarian economist Bryan Caplan, he even argues that such agreements are
independent of political views:
Caplan is careful to note when economists agree about matters that are not explained by their background
ideologies. So, for instance, left-wing, right-wing, moderate, and libertarian economists all support free trade.
It’s not their overall ideologies that are at work here but rather the fact that they understand and accept
mainstream economics. (Brennan 2016: 372)
The reason why it appears to Brennan and Caplan that there is consensus on a controversial issue
such as free trade is that they don’t look far enough. Perhaps justiﬁably. Joan Robinson is long
dead, and Ha-Joon Chang is a highly heterodox (i.e. ‘non-mainstream’) economist. The German
Historical School whose ‘infant-industry argument’ against free trade for developing nations Chang
has revived, is long forgotten. And yet, what I have said above about the nature of social science
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knowledge indicates that the existing consensus in mainstream economics (if Brennan and Caplan
are right) exists due to conformism.
Conformism can have a variety of sources. Here are some:
● Common acceptance of a bad theory. This might explain the high degree of subscription to
Ricardo’s free trade theory by contemporary mainstream economists. Almost every economist
teaching at a highly ranked university in the U.S. and elsewhere has been brought up on the
same set of neoclassical principles that is but one school of economics and in no way
exhausts economic ideas (Chang 2014). That neoclassical economics is dominant in the
profession today is largely an accident of history (Yonay 1998). At any rate, what should be
obvious is that neoclassical economics is not without alternatives.
● Common acceptance of a bad methodology. ‘Evidence-based’ paradigms are dominant in con-
temporary medicine and social policy. The ‘evidence-based’ label is used to describe
a methodology that regards randomised trials as the gold standard for causal inference and
downplays evidence generated by any other method. Most philosophers of science who write on
the topic are highly critical of the evidence-based movements. And yet, because they dominate
large ﬁelds within medicine and social policy, it is certainly conceivable that a knowledge claim
becomes generally accepted because it seems to be supported by randomised studies, but it
would not be accepted if a broader view of evidence had been taken.
● Selection bias. It doesn’t take much imagination to suppose that the members of some
scientiﬁc ﬁelds self-selected into these ﬁelds on the basis of certain beliefs about the world
or certain moral values. Let us just say that there aren’t many conservatives in gender studies,
or subscribers to certain claims (such as ‘there are two biological sexes’ or ‘biology has an
inﬂuence on behaviour’) which, among biologists, are uncontroversial.
● Bad social values. Up until the 1960s the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM) classiﬁed homosexuality as a mental disorder, transsexuality still is so classiﬁed (as
gender dysphoria). There is no doubt that social values have aﬀected these classiﬁcations, and
when the values held by scientists are not or no longer held in society, a scientiﬁc consensus
on a matter will be of little relevance to society at large.
For these reasons I reject any attempt, on the part of scientists themselves or of philosophers or
any other students of science, to strengthen the role of experts in society. Experts need to be kept
in check, not given more power. Scientiﬁc conclusions – theories, concepts, facts – are enormously
useful for individual and political decision making, but only if they are regarded as that: tools for
thinking (and not as commands for action).
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